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Abstract
In this work, using a game-theoretic approach, cost-sensitive mechanisms that lead to reliable Internet-based
computing are designed. In particular, we consider Internet-based master-worker computations, where a master
processor assigns, across the Internet, a computational task to a set of potentially untrusted worker processors and
collects their responses. Workers may collude in order to increase their benefit.
Several game-theoretic models that capture the nature of the problem are analyzed, and algorithmic mechanisms
that, for each given set of cost and system parameters, achieve high reliability are designed. Additionally, two
specific realistic system scenarios are studied. These scenarios are a system of volunteer computing like SETI, and a
company that buys computing cycles from Internet computers and sells them to its customers in the form of a task-
computation service. Notably, under certain conditions, non redundant allocation yields the best trade-off between
cost and reliability.
Keywords: Internet-based computing; algorithmic mechanism design; master-worker computing; collu-
sion.
1 Introduction
Motivation. As traditional one-processor machines have limited computational resources, and powerful parallel
machines are very expensive to obtain and maintain, the Internet is emerging as a viable computational platform for
processing complex computational jobs. Several Internet-oriented systems and protocols have been designed to operate
on top of this global computation infrastructure; examples include Grid systems [12, 44], the “@home” projects [2],
such as SETI [27] (a classical example of volunteer computing), and peer-to-peer computing–P2PC [16,46]. Although
the potential is great, the use of Internet-based computing is limited by the untrustworthiness nature of the platform’s
components [2,18]. Let us take SETI as an example. In SETI, data is distributed for processing to millions of voluntary
machines around the world. At a conceptual level, in SETI there is a machine, call it the master, that sends jobs, across
the Internet, to these computers, call them the workers. These workers execute and report back the result of the task
computation. However, these workers are not trustworthy, and hence might report incorrect results. In SETI, the master
attempts to minimize the impact of these bogus results by assigning the same task to several workers and comparing
their outcomes (that is, redundant task allocation is employed [2]), but there are also other methods [10, 25, 45].
In this paper, Internet-based master-worker computations are studied from a game-theoretic point of view. Specifi-
cally, these computations are modeled as games where each worker chooses whether to be honest (that is, compute and
return the correct task result) or a cheater (that is, fabricate a bogus result and return it to the master). Additionally,
cost-sensitive mechanisms (algorithms) that provide the necessary incentive for the workers to truthfully compute and
∗This work is supported in part by the Cyprus Research Promotion Foundation grant TΠE/ΠΛHPO/0609(BE)/05, Comunidad de Madrid
grant S2009TIC-1692, Spanish MICINN grant TIN2008–06735-C02-01, and the National Science Foundation (CCF 1114930, CCF 0937829). A
preliminary version of this work appears in the Proceedings of NCA 2008, pages 315–324.
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report the correct result are designed. The objective is to maximize the probability of the master of obtaining the
correct result while minimizing its cost (or alternatively, increasing its benefit). In particular, we identify and propose
mechanisms for two paradigmatic applications. Namely, a computing system as the aforementioned SETI where com-
puting processors volunteer to donate part of their processing time, and a second scenario where a company distributes
computing tasks among contractor processors that get an economic reward in exchange.
Although the presentation is self-contained, it is assumed familiarity with basic concepts in Game Theory. For
further details please refer to [38].
Background and Prior/Related Work. Prior examples of Game Theory in distributed computing include work on
Internet routing [28,30,39], resource/facility location and sharing [17,20,23], containment of viruses spreading [33],
secret sharing [1, 22], and task computations [46]. For more discussion on the connection between Game Theory and
computing we refer the reader to the survey by Halpern [21] and the book by Nisan et al. [36].
In traditional distributed computing, the behavior of the system components (i.e., processors) is characterized a
priori as either good or bad, depending on whether they follow the prescribed protocol or not. In Game Theory,
processors are assumed to act on their own self-interest and they do not have an a priori established behavior. Such
processors are usually referred as rational [1,18]. In other words, the processors decide on how to act in an attempt to
increase their own benefit, or alternatively to lower their own cost.
In Algorithmic Mechanism Design [1, 13, 35, 37], games are designed to provide the necessary incentives so that
processors’ interests are best served by acting “correctly.” The usual practice is to provide some reward (resp. penalty)
should the processors (resp. do not) behave as desired.
In [14, 26, 40] reliable master-worker computations have been considered by redundant task-allocation. In these
works probabilistic guarantees of obtaining the correct result while minimizing the cost (number of workers chosen
to perform the task or amount of redundant allocation) are also shown. However, a traditional distributed computing
approach is used, in which the behavior of each worker is predefined. In this paper, much richer payoff parameters
are studied and the behavior of each worker is not predefined, introducing new challenges that naturally drive to a
game-theoretic approach.
Two other related works [7, 42] where the worker behavior is predefined consider collusion in desktop grid com-
puting. In both proposals, the goal is to identify colluders by means of a statistical analysis that requires the processors
to compute multiple times. In the present paper, we study the more challenging problem of dealing with collusion
when each processor computes only once.
Previous work directly related to the present paper is included in [46] and [15], where master-worker computations
in a game-theoretic model are also studied. In [46], the master can audit the results returned by rational workers with
a tunable probability. Bounds for that audit probability are computed to guarantee that workers have incentives to
be honest in three scenarios: redundant allocation with and without collusion1, and single-worker allocation. They
conclude that, in their model, single-worker allocation is a cost-effective mechanism specially in presence of collusion.
In the present paper, a general study of how to carry out the computation depending on the system parameters (reward
model, payoffs, bounds on utility or probability of incorrect result, etc.) is given (see Tables 5 and 6). For some cases
studied here, the conclusion that redundant allocation does not help is also extracted. (E.g., in a scenario where only the
number of workers is a choice and the result must be correct with probability 1 for any payoff values.) However, this
may not be always the case. For scenarios where the system parameters yield redundant allocation as the best approach,
the analysis provided may be used by the master to choose games and reward models conveniently. Additionally, our
work complements that work in various ways, such as studying more games, including a richer payoff model, or
considering probabilistic cheating. Finally, useful trade-offs between the benefit of the master and the probability of
accepting an incorrect result are shown for the one-round protocol we propose. After the conference version of the
present paper, in [15] and [6], we extended the potential worker personalities with malicious and altruistic behaviors,
but without considering collusion. Under this model, we explore only a subset of the games studied here.
Distributed computation in presence of selfishness was also studied within the scope of Combinatorial Agencies
in Economics [3, 4, 5, 11]. The basic model considered is a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent
problem [31]: A master (principal) must motivate a collection of workers (agents) to exert costly effort on the master’s
behalf, but the workers’ actions are hidden from the master. Instead of focusing on each worker actions, the focus
1Cooperation among various workers concealed from the master.
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is on complex combinations of the efforts of the workers that influence the outcome. In [3], where the problem was
first introduced, the goal was to study how the utility of the master is affected if the equilibria space is limited to pure
strategies. I.e., equilibria computation where it is assumed that the players do not randomize their choice and, instead,
deterministically choose among one of the available strategies. To that extent, the computation of a few Boolean
functions is evaluated. In [5] mixed strategies were considered: if the parameters of the problem yield multiple mixed
equilibrium points, it is assumed that workers accept one “suggested” by the master. This is contrasted with our work
as we require the master to enforce a single equilibrium point (referred as strong implementation in [3]). The work
in [11] investigates the effect of auditing by allowing the master to audit some workers (by random sampling) and
verify their work. In our work, the master decides probabilistically whether to verify all workers or none. In general,
the spirit of the framework considered in Combinatorial agency is similar to the one we consider in the present work in
the sense that there is a master wishing a specific outcome and it must provide necessary incentives to rational workers
so to reach that outcome (exerting effort can be considered as the worker performing the task, and not, as the worker
not performing the task and reporting a bogus result). However, there are several differences. The main difference
is that in our framework, the worker actions cannot really be viewed as hidden. The master receives a response by
each worker and it is aware that either the worker has truthfully performed the task or not. The outcome is affected
by each worker’s action in the case that no verification is performed (in a similar fashion as the majority boolean
“technology” in Combinatorial agency) but via verification the master can determine the exact strategy used by each
worker and apply a specific reward/punishment scheme. In the framework considered in combinatorial agency, the
master witnesses the outcome of the computation, but it has no knowledge of the possible actions that the worker
might take. For this purpose, the master needs to devise contracts for each worker based on the observed outcome
of the computation and not on each worker’s possible action (as in our framework). Another important difference
includes the fact that our scheme considers worker punishment, as opposed to the schemes in combinatorial agency
where workers cannot be fined (limited liability constraint); this is possible in our framework as workers’ actions are
“contractible” (either it performs a task or not).
Monderer and Tennenholtz [32] consider a master-worker framework where the master wishes to influence the
behavior of rational workers in a game, which is not under the master’s control. Namely, the master cannot design
a new game, cannot enforce worker’s behavior, cannot penalize the workers and cannot prohibit strategies available
to the workers. In the framework we consider in the present work, the master might not be able to control all the
parameters of the game (e.g., the various reward schemes and other system parameters that are part of the game) but
it can indirectly influence the behavior of the workers by the one parameter that it surely controls: the probability of
auditing the results returned by the workers.
A somewhat related work is [8] in which they face the problem of bootstrapping a P2P computing system, in
the presence of rational peers. The goal is to incentivize peers to join the system, for which they propose a scheme
that mixes lottery psychology and multilevel marketing. In our setting, the master could use their scheme to recruit
workers. We assume in this paper that enough workers are willing to participate in the computation.
Du et al. [10] present a commitment-based sampling scheme for cheater detection in Grid computing that is based
on Merkle trees. Their model considers a task as a domain of inputs D = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and a function f such
that each f(x) must be computed for all x ∈ D. Instead of using redundant task allocation (as in our work), or
double-checking the worker’s computation for each x, the master allocates the task to a worker and randomly selects
a small number of inputs from D and double-checks these results. As the authors point out, their technique works
well for input domains of large size (large |D|) but does not for small |D|; our redundant allocation scheme could be
considered for such small-sized input domains.
Kuhn et al. [29] consider a distributed verification mechanism for computational Grids. Instead of having the
master checking and detecting cheaters, their mechanism passes this “responsibility” to the workers. The master
distributes two different kinds of tasks to workers, regular computation tasks, and checking units. For the first type
the worker is required to compute its result, as oppose to checking tasks that require the worker to perform a number
of checks for different results reported by other workers. Workers are encouraged to act correctly via credit points
(that can be either used in a form of prestige, or be converted to real money). The work in the present paper focuses
on having the master to obtain the correct result within some probability of success rather than detecting cheaters
(partially this is achieved, but it is not the main objective of the master). For cheater detection to be beneficiary,
the computation must be run over several rounds. Our work, instead, considers a one-shot protocol that enables fast
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termination (the benefit of one-round mechanisms is partially supported by the work of Kondo et al. [25] that have
demonstrated experimentally that tasks may take much more than one day of CPU time to complete).
Framework. We consider a distributed system consisting of a master processor that assigns a computational task
to a set of workers to compute and return the task result. The tasks considered in this work are assumed to have a
unique solution. Although such limitation reduces the scope of application of the mechanisms presented [43], there
are plenty of computations where the correct solution is unique. E.g., any mathematical function. Notice that we
consider one-shot computations only. I.e., in this work we do not consider multiple computations where workers may
accumulate reputation according to past behavior.
It is assumed that the master has the possibility of verifying whether the value returned by a worker is the correct
result of the task. It is also assumed that verifying an answer is more efficient than computing the task [19] (e.g.,
NP -complete problems if P 6= NP ), but the correct result of the computation is not obtained if the verification fails.
Therefore, by verifying, the master does not necessarily obtain the correct answer (e.g., when all workers cheat)2.
As in [8, 46], workers are assumed to be rational and seek to maximize their benefit, i.e., they are not destructively
malicious. We note that this assumption can conceptually be justified by the work of Shneidman and Parkes [41]
where they reason on the connection of rational players–of Algorithmic Mechanism Design–and workers in realistic
P2P systems. Furthermore, we do not consider non-intentional errors produced by hardware or software problems.
The general protocol used by master and workers is the following. The master process assigns the task to n
workers. Each worker processor i cheats with probability p(i)C and the master processor verifies the answers with some
probability pV . If the master processor verifies, it rewards the honest workers and penalizes the cheaters. If the master
does not verify, it accepts the answer returned by the majority of workers. However, it does not penalize any worker
given that the majority can be actually cheating. Instead, the master rewards workers according to one of the three
following models. Either the master rewards the majority only (Reward Model Rm), or the master rewards all workers
independently of the returned value (Reward Model Ra), or the master does not reward at all (Reward Model R∅).
The model used in this paper comprises the following form of collusion (that covers realistic types of collusions
such as Sybil attacks [9]). Workers form colluding groups. Within the same group workers act homogeneously, i.e.,
either all choose to cheat, or all choose to be honest, perhaps randomizing their decision by tossing a unique coin. In
the case that, within the group, all workers choose to be honest, then only one of them computes the task, and all of
them return that result to the master (in this way they avoid the cost of all of them executing the task). In the case
that all workers choose to cheat, then they simply agree on a bogus result and send that to the master. In addition, we
assume that all “cheating groups” return the same incorrect answer. Both assumptions (homogeneous behavior within
groups and unique incorrect answer) are adversarial. Since the master accepts the majority, this behavior maximizes
the chances of cheating the master. Being this the worst case (see also [40]), it subsumes models where cheaters do
not necessarily return the same answer. Note that this behavior can be viewed also as a form of collusion. However,
this observation does not imply that cheaters coordinate among them such behavior. We also assume that if a worker
does not perform the task, then it is (almost) impossible to guess the correct answer (i.e., the probability is negligible).
The master, of course, is not aware of the collusions.
Given the protocol above, the game is defined by a set of parameters that include rewards to the workers that return
the correct value and punishments to the workers that cheated (that is, returned the incorrect result and “got caught”).
Hence, the game is played between the master and the workers, where the first wants to obtain the correct result with
a desired probability, while obtaining a desired utility value (in expectation), and the workers decide whether to be
honest or cheaters, depending on their expected utility gain or loss. In this paper, we design several games and study
the conditions under which unique Nash equilibria (NE) are achieved. The reason for uniqueness is to force all workers
to the same strategy; this is similar to strong implementation in Mechanism Design, cf., [3]. (Multiple equilibria could
be considered, making further assumptions about the procedure that workers follow to choose one of them. Although
the approach might be promising in terms of the utility for the master, in this work correctness is the priority, which
as shown later the mechanisms presented here guarantee.) Each NE results in a different benefit for the master and
a different probability of accepting an incorrect result. Thus, the master can choose some game conditions so that a
unique NE that best fits its goals is achieved.
2Alternatively, one might assume that the master verifies by simply performing the task and checking the answers of the workers. Our analysis
can easily be modified to accommodate this different model.
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Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:
1. The identification of a collection of realistic payoff parameters that allow to model Internet-based master-worker
computational environments in game theoretic terms. These parameters can either be fixed because they are system
parameters or be chosen by the master.
2. The definition of four different games that the master can force to be played: (a) A game between the master and
a single worker, (b) a game between the master and a worker, played n times (with different workers), (c) a game
with a master and n workers, and (d) a game of n workers in which the master participates indirectly. Games (c) and
(d) consider collusions, game (a) considers no collusions as there is only one worker, and game (b) only considers
singleton groups, where all cheaters return the same value. Together with the three reward models defined above, we
have overall defined twelve games among which the master can choose the most convenient to use in each specific
context.
3. The analyses of all the games under general payoff models, and the characterization of conditions under which a
unique Nash Equilibrium point is reached for each game and each payoff-model. These analyses lead to mechanisms
that the master can run to trade cost and reliability.
4. The design of mechanisms for two specific realistic scenarios, to demonstrate the utility of the analysis. These
scenarios reflect, in their fundamental elements, (a) a system of volunteer computing like SETI, and (b) a company
that buys computing cycles from Internet computers and sells them to its customers in the form of a task-computation
service. The analysis provided for these scenarios in Tables 5 and 6 comprise implicitly a mechanism to decide how to
carry out the computation. More specifically, depending on the various parameters of the problem, such as the instance
of payoff values, the desired probability of obtaining the correct answer, or a (possibly negative) lower bound on the
master’s utility, the master may obtain from these tables the game to be played and the reward model that maximally
benefit its goal: accuracy, utility, or both.
5. As examples of the use of the mechanism designed, we consider computations where the result must be correct with
probability 1 for any instance of payoff values. Under such requirement, our results show that for scenario (a) the best
choice is non-redundant allocation, even with only singleton colluding groups. Furthermore, in this case we show that
to obtain always the correct answer it is enough to verify with arbitrarily small probability. Regarding examples of
scenario (b), under the same requirement, we evaluate the mechanism for settings where one of three parameter values
can be chosen: the number of workers, the worker’s punishment for being caught cheating, or the cost of computing
the task. If the master only chooses the number of workers n, we show that, again even with only singleton colluding
groups the best choice is non-redundant allocation. However, in order to achieve correctness, the required probability
of verifying can now be large. When only one of the other two parameters is a choice of the master, namely either the
worker’s punishment for being caught cheating or the cost of computing the task, we show that the best game is not
unique, and it depends on the rest of parameters of the system.
In general our analysis depicts the tradeoffs between cost and reliability for a wide range of system parameters,
payoffs, and reward models.
Paper Structure. In Section 2 we provide basic definitions to be used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we present
and analyze the games proposed. In Section 4 the mechanisms for the two realistic scenarios are designed. Finally,
Section 5 presents conclusions and future lines of work.
2 Definitions
Game Definition. Game participants are referred as workers and master. In order to define the game played in each
case, we follow the customary notation used in Game Theory. Given that this notation is repeatedly used throughout
the paper, we summarize it in Table 1 for clarity. We assume that the master always chooses an odd number of
workers n, which avoids ties in voting settings where the answer space is binary as it is assumed in this paper as a
worst case. In order to model collusion among workers, we view the set of workers as a set of non-empty subsets
W = {W1, . . . ,Wℓ} such that
∑ℓ
i=1 |Wi| = n and Wi ∩Wj = ∅ for all i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ℓ. We refer to each of these
subsets as a group of workers or a group for short. We also refer to groups and the master as players. Workers in the
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same group act homogeneously, i.e., either all choose to cheat, or all choose to be honest, perhaps randomizing their
decision by tossing a unique coin. Workers acting individually are modeled as a group of size one. It is assumed that
the size or composition of each group is known only to the members of the group, but all cheating groups return the
same incorrect answer.
A strategy profile is defined as a mapping from players to pure strategies, denoted as s. For succinctness, we
express a strategy profile as a collection of individual strategy choices together with collective strategy choices. For
instance, si = C, sM = V,R−iM , F−iM , T−iM stands for a strategy profile s where group Wi chooses strategy C
(to cheat), the master chooses strategy V (to verify), a set R−iM of groups (where group Wi and the master are not
included) randomize their strategy choice with probability pC ∈ (0, 1), a set F−iM of groups deterministically choose
strategy C, and a set T−iM of groups deterministically choose strategy C (to be honest). For games with one worker
and the master, the strategy profile is composed only by their choices. For example, mCV stands for the master’s
payoff in the case that the worker cheated and the master verified. We require that, for each group Wi, p(i)C = 1− p(i)C
and, for the master, pV = 1−pV . For games where we only have one group or all groups use the same probability, we
will express p(i)C (resp. p(i)C ) simply by pC (resp. pC). Whenever the strategy is clear from the context, we will refer
to the expected utility of group Wi as Ui, and for the master as UM . In the games studied the master and the workers
have complete information on the algorithm and the parameters involved, except on the number and the composition
of the colluding groups.
Equilibrium Definition. We define now precisely the conditions for the equilibrium. In this context, the probability
distributions are not independent among members of a group. Furthermore, the formulation of equilibrium conditions
among individual workers would violate the very definition of equilibrium since the choice of a worker does change the
choices of other workers. Instead, equilibrium conditions are formulated among groups. Of course, the computation
of an equilibrium might not be possible since the size of the groups is unknown. But, finding appropriate conditions so
that the unique equilibrium is the same independently of that size, the problem may be solved. As it will be seen in the
general analysis, depending on the specific combination of payoffs, reward models, and games, knowing some bound
(e.g. the trivial one) on the size of the smallest and/or largest group is enough, and sometimes not even necessary.
Furthermore, as shown in Section 4, there are cases where all groups are singleton because non-redundant allocation is
the best strategy. An important point to be made is that the majority is evaluated in terms of number of single answers.
Nevertheless, this fact has an impact on the payoffs of each player, which in this case is a whole group, but not in the
correctness of the equilibrium formulation.
Recall from [38] that for any finite game, a mixed strategy profile σ∗ is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE)
if, and only if, for each player π (either a worker group or the master),
Uπ(sπ, σ
∗
−π) = Uπ(s
′
π, σ
∗
−π), ∀sπ, s′π ∈ supp(σ∗π), (1)
Uπ(sπ, σ
∗
−π) ≥ Uπ(s′π, σ∗−π), ∀sπ, s′π : sπ ∈ supp(σ∗π), s′π /∈ supp(σ∗π). (2)
In words, given a MSNE with mixed-strategy profile σ∗, for each player π, the expected utility, assuming that all
other players do not change their choice, is the same for each pure strategy that the player can choose with positive
probability in σ∗, and it is not less than the expected utility of any pure strategy with probability zero of being chosen
in σ∗. A fully MSNE is an equilibrium with mixed strategy profile σ where, for each player π, supp(σπ) = Sπ.
Payoffs Definition. We detail in Table 2 the payoff definitions that will be used throughout the paper. All the
parameters in this table are non-negative.
Notice that we split the reward to a worker into WBA and MCA, to model the fact that the cost of the master
might be different than the benefit of a worker. In fact, in some models they may be completely unrelated. Among the
parameters involved, we assume that the master has the freedom of choosing the cheater penalty WPC and the worker
reward for computing MCA. By tuning these parameters and choosing n, the master achieves the desired trade-off
between correctness and cost. Given that the master does not know the composition of groups (if there is any), benefits
and punishments are applied individually to each worker, except for the cost for computing the task WCT which is
shared among all workers belonging to the same group (as it was explained in the Introduction). Sharing the task
cost while being paid/punished individually may provide incentive to collude, but it models precisely the real world
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ms payoff of the master for the strategy profile s
M master processor
p
(i)
si probability that group Wi uses strategy si
psM probability that the master uses strategy sM
s strategy profile (a mapping from players to pure strategies)
s−i strategy used by each player but Wi in the strategy profile s
si strategy used by group Wi in the strategy profile s
Si = {C,C} set of pure strategies (cheat/not-cheat) available to group Wi
s−M strategy used by each player but the master in the strategy profile s
sM strategy used by the master in the strategy profile s
SM = {V, V } set of pure strategies (verify/not-verify) of the master
supp(σi) set of strategies of group Wi with probability > 0 (called support) in σ
supp(σM ) set of strategies of the master with probability > 0 (called support) in σ
σ mixed strategy profile (a mapping from players to prob. distrib. over pure strategies)
σ−i probability distribution over pure strategies used by each player but Wi in σ
σi probability distribution over pure strategies used by group Wi in σ
σ−M probability distribution over pure strategies used by each player but the master in σ
σM probability distribution over pure strategies used by the master in σ
Ui(si, σ−i) expected utility of group Wi with mixed strategy profile σ
UM (sM , σ−M ) expected utility of master with mixed strategy profile σ
w
(i)
s payoff of group Wi for the strategy profile s
W = {W1, . . . ,Wℓ} set of worker groups
Table 1: Game notation
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WPC worker’s punishment for being caught cheating
WCT group’s cost for computing the task
WBA worker’s benefit from master’s acceptance
MPW master’s punishment for accepting a wrong answer
MCA master’s cost for accepting the worker’s answer
MCV master’s cost for verifying worker’s answers
MBR master’s benefit from accepting the right answer
Table 2: Payoffs
situation where the collusion is carried out in secret. Otherwise, a colluding group could be simply taken as a single
player.
3 Equilibria Analysis
In the following sections, different games are studied depending on the participants involved. In order to identify the
parameter conditions for which there is an NE, Equations (1) and (2) of the MSNE definition are instantiated in each
particular game, without making any assumptions on the payoffs. We call this the general payoffs model. From these
instantiations, we obtain conditions on the parameters (payoffs and probabilities) that would make such equilibrium
unique. Finally, we introduce the reward models described before on those conditions, so that we can compare among
all games and models in Section 4.
3.1 Game 1:1: One Master - One Worker
We start the analysis by considering the game between the master and only one worker. Hence, collusions can not
occur and we refer to the group just as “the worker.”
General Payoffs Model. In order to evaluate all possible equilibria, all the different mixes have to be considered. In
other words, according with the range of values that pC and pV can take, we can have fully MSNE, partially MSNE,
or pure-strategies NE. More specifically, both pC and pV can take values either 0, 1, or in the open interval (0, 1).
Depending on these values, the different conditions in Equations (1) and (2) have to be achieved in order to have an
equilibrium. Hence, conditions on pC and pV for each equilibrium can be obtained from these equations.
For instance, for the case when pC ∈ (0, 1), pV ∈ (0, 1): From Equation (1), there is a fully MSNE ifUM (V, pC) =
UM (V , pC) and UW (C, pV ) = UW (C, pV ) simultaneously. These equations determine the value of pC and pV in the
MSNE as follows.
pCmCV + (1− pC)mCV = pCmCV + (1− pC)mCV
pC =
mCV −mCV
mCV −mCV −mCV +mCV
.
pV wCV + (1− pV )wCV = pV wCV + (1− pV )wCV
pV =
wCV − wCV
wCV − wCV − wCV + wCV
.
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The computation of conditions for the other range-cases of pC and pV is similar.
On the other hand, the expected utility of the master and the worker in any equilibrium areUM = pCpVmCV +(1−
pC)pVmCV +pC(1−pV )mCV +(1−pC)(1−pV )mCV andUW = pCpV wCV +pC(1−pV )wCV +(1−pC)pV wCV +
(1− pC)(1− pV )wCV respectively, and the probability of accepting the wrong answer is Pwrong = (1− pV )pC .
Reward Model Rm. Recall that in this model we assume that when the master does not verify, it rewards only the
majority. Given that there is only one worker, in this case the master rewards always. Under the payoff model detailed
in Table 2, the payoffs are
mCV = −MCV wCV = −WPC
mCV = MBR −MCV −MCA wCV = WBA −WCT
mCV = −MPW −MCA wCV = WBA
mCV = MBR −MCA wCV = WBA −WCT
Replacing appropriately, we obtain the conditions for equilibrium, probability of accepting the wrong answer, and
utilities for each case.
Reward Model Ra. In this model we assume that if the master does not verify, it rewards all workers independently
of the answer. Hence, the analysis is identical to the previous case.
Reward Model R∅. Recall that in this model we assume that if the master does not verify, it does not reward the
worker. Hence, under the payoff model detailed in Table 2, the payoffs are:
mCV = −MCV wCV = −WPC
mCV = MBR −MCV −MCA wCV = WBA −WCT
mCV = −MPW wCV = 0
mCV = MBR wCV = −WCT
Replacing appropriately, we obtain the conditions for equilibrium, probability of accepting the wrong answer, and
utilities for each case, as we will see in the next section. The probability of accepting the wrong result, the master
utility for each case, the conditions for equilibrium, and the workers utility for the reward models Rm and R∅ can be
obtained from Tables 3 and 4 by replacing n = 1.
3.2 Game 1:1n: n Games One to One
In this section it is considered the case where the master runs n instances of the one to one game analyzed in the
previous section. Workers are assumed to compute the equilibrium as if they were playing alone against the master.
Hence, given the assumption that the players are rational and compute the equilibrium to decide what to do, the
consideration of collusion is meaningless for this game. Hence, all groups are assumed to have exactly one member;
we do assume however that cheaters return the same incorrect value (to obtain worst case analysis). Games where
workers know about the existence of other workers and they can collude to fool the master are studied later. Given the
equilibria computed in Section 3.1, the master runs n instances of that game, one with each of the n workers, choosing
to verify or not with probability pV only once. Additionally, when paying while not verifying, the master rewards all
or none according with the one-to-one game.
9
General Payoffs Model. Since this game is just a multiple-instance version of the previous game, under the payoff
model detailed in Table 2, the conditions for equilibria and the utility of a worker are the same as in Section 3.1.
However, the expected utility of the master and the probability of accepting the wrong result change. In order to give
those expressions, we define the following notation. Let W be the set of partitions in two subsets (F, T ) of W , i.e.,
W = {(F, T )|F ∩ T = ∅, F ∪ T = W}. F is the set of workers that cheat and T the set of honest workers. We also
define master payoff functions ms : {0, 1, . . . , n} → R, that still depend on the number of workers that cheat or not,
but are not necessarily just n times the individual payoff of a 1:1 game (reflecting the fact that the cost may include
some fixed amount for unique verification or unique cost of being wrong). For the sake of clarity, we will denote the
probability that the majority cheats as PC .
Then, the probability that the majority cheats, the probability of being wrong, and the master’s utility are
PC =
∑
(F,T )∈W
|F |>|T |
∏
f∈F
p
(f)
C
∏
t∈T
(1 − p(t)C ),
Pwrong =(1− pV )PC ,
UM =pV
∑
(F,T )∈W
∏
f∈F
p
(f)
C
∏
t∈T
(1− p(t)C )mV + (1− pV )
∑
(F,T )∈W
∏
f∈F
p
(f)
C
∏
t∈T
(1− p(t)C )mV .
Respectively, where mV = mCV (|F |) +mCV (|T |) and mV = mCV (|F |) +mCV (|T |).
Reward Models. In this game, we assume that the cost of verificationMCV is independent of the number of workers
(since all cheating workers return the same value) and that, as long as some worker is honest, upon verification the
master obtains the correct result. It is important to note that, under this assumption, the probability of obtaining the
correct result is not 1 − Pwrong, given that if the master verifies but all workers cheat, the master does not obtain
the correct result. Recall that the master plays n instances of a one-to-one game, thus, depending on the model, it
must reward every worker if not verifying independently of majorities. We summarize the probability of accepting
the wrong result, the master utility for each case, the conditions for equilibrium, and the workers utility for the reward
models Rm and R∅ in Tables 3 and 4 respectively (Tables 3 and 4 give also these values for Game 1 :1 replacing
appropriately n = 1).
3.3 Game 0:n: No Master in the Game
Another natural generalization of the game of Section 3.1 is to consider a game in which the master assigns the task
to n workers that play the game among them. Intuitively, it can be seen that, in case of not verifying, workers will
compete to be in the majority (to persuade the master). Given that workers know the existence of the other workers,
including collusions in the analysis is in order. The question of how the participation of the master in the game would
affect the results obtained in this section is addressed in Section 3.4.
General Payoffs Model. In order to analyze this game, it is convenient to partition the set of groups. More precisely,
consider disjoint sets F , T and R, such that F ∪ T ∪ R = W , as follows. F is the set of groups that choose to
cheat as a pure strategy, i.e., F = {Wi|Wi ∈ W ∧ p(i)C = 1}. T is the set of groups that choose not to cheat
as a pure strategy, i.e., T = {Wi|Wi ∈ W ∧ p(i)C = 0}. R is the set of groups that randomize their choice, i.e.,
R = {Wi|Wi ∈ W ∧ p(i)C ∈ (0, 1)}. Let F−i = F \ {Wi}, T−i = T \ {Wi}, and R−i = R \ {Wi}. Let Γ−i be the set
of partitions in two subsets (RF , RT ) of R−i, i.e., Γ−i = {(RF , RT )|RF ∩RT = ∅∧RF ∪RT = R−i}. Let E[w(i)s ]
be the expected payoff of group Wi for the strategy profile s, taking the expectation over the choice of the master of
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Equilibrium
pC , pV
Conditions Pwrong UM UWi
MCV
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1− pV )PC
pV ((1− p
n
C)MBR−
MCV − (1− pC)nMCA)+
(1− pV )(MBR(1−PC)−
MPWPC − nMCA)
WBA −WCT
0,
WCT
WBA+WPC
≤ pV < 1
0 < pV
MCV = 0 0 MBR − nMCA WBA −WCT
1,
0 < pV ≤
WCT
WBA+WPC
pV < 1
MCV = MPW +MCA 1− pV −pV MCV − (1− pV )(MPW + nMCA)
(1−pV )WBA−
pV WPC
0 ≤ pC ≤
MCV
MCA+MPW
pC < 1
, 0 WCT = 0 PC MBR(1−PC)−MPWPC − nMCA WBA
MCV
MCA+MPW
≤ pC < 1
0 < pC
, 1 WCT = WBA +WPC 0
(1−
∏
j∈W p
(j)
C
)MBR −MCV−
∑
(WF ,WT )∈W
∏
j∈WF
p
(j)
C
·
∏
k∈WT
(1− p
(k)
C
)|WT |MCA
−WPC
1, 1
MCV ≤ MPW +MCA
WCT ≥ WBA +WPC
0 −MCV −WPC
0, 1
MCV = 0
WCT ≤ WBA +WPC
0 MBR − nMCA WBA −WCT
1, 0 MCV ≥ MPW +MCA 1 −MPW − nMCA WBA
Table 3: Game 1:1n, Models Rm and Ra (and Game 1:1 for n = 1)
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Equilibrium
pC , pV
Conditions Pwrong UM UWi
MCV +MCA
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1− pV )PC
pV ((1− p
n
C)MBR−
MCV − (1− pC)nMCA)+
(1− pV )(MBR(1−PC)−
MPWPC)
−pV WPC
0,
WCT
WBA+WPC
≤ pV < 1
0 < pV
MCA = MCV = 0 0 MBR pV WBA −WCT
1,
0 < pV ≤
WCT
WBA+WPC
pV < 1
MCV = MPW 1 − pV −MCV −pV WPC
0 ≤ pC ≤
MCV +MCA
MCA+MPW
pC < 1
, 0 WCT = 0 PC MBR(1−PC) −MPWPC 0
MCV +MCA
MCA+MPW
≤ pC < 1
0 < pC
, 1 WCT = WBA +WPC 0
(1−
∏
j∈W p
(j)
C
)MBR −MCV−
∑
(WF ,WT )∈W
∏
j∈WF
p
(j)
C
·
∏
k∈WT
(1− p
(k)
C
)|WT |MCA
−WPC
1, 1
MCV ≤ MPW
WCT ≥ WBA +WPC
0 −MCV −WPC
0, 1
MCV = MCA = 0
WCT ≤ WBA +WPC
0 MBR WBA −WCT
1, 0 MCV ≥ MPW 1 −MPW 0
Table 4: Game 1:1n, Model R∅ (and Game 1:1 for n = 1)
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verifying or not. Then, for each group Wi ∈ W and for each strategy profile s−i = R−i, F−i, T−i, we have
Ui(s−i, si = C) =
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ−i
∏
Wf∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
Wt∈RT
(1− p(t)C )E[w(i)F−i∪RF ,
T−i∪RT ,
si=C
],
Ui(s−i, si = C) =
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ−i
∏
Wf∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
Wt∈RT
(1− p(t)C )E[w(i)F−i∪RF ,
T−i∪RT ,
si=C
].
In words, the expected utility of a worker in a group that chooses to cheat (resp. to be honest) is, by linearity of
expectation, the expected payoff of the worker, the expectation taken over the choice of the master, averaged over all
combinations of outcomes cheat/honest of other groups that choose to randomize their strategy choice, this average
weighted by the probability of such outcomes.
In order to find conditions for a desired equilibrium, we study what we call the utility differential of a worker, i.e.
the difference on the expected utility of a worker if its group chooses to cheat with respect to the case when the group
chooses to be honest. More precisely,
∆Ui(s) = Ui(s−i, si = C)− Ui(s−i, si = C). (3)
For clarity, define NF−i =
∑
S∈F−i∪RF
|S| and NT−i =
∑
S∈T−i∪RT
|S|, i.e. the number of cheaters and honest
workers respectively except for those in groupWi. We also define what we call the payoff differential as the difference
on the expected payoff of a worker, the expectation taken over the choice of the master, if its group chooses to cheat
with respect to the case when the group chooses to be honest. Furthermore, we denote the payoff differential depending
on whether the size of the group has an impact on what is the majority outcome. More precisely, for each partition
(RF , RT ) ∈ Γi, let
∆w
(i)
C = E[w
(i)
si=C
]−E[w(i)
si=C
], when NF−i −NT−i > |Wi|,
∆w
(i)
C
= E[w
(i)
si=C
]−E[w(i)
si=C
], when NT−i −NF−i > |Wi|, and
∆w
(i)
X = E[w
(i)
si=C
]−E[w(i)
si=C
], when |NF−i −NT−i| < |Wi|.
In words, the payoff differential of each worker in a group when the majority cheats or is honest independently of
the group’s choice, and the payoff differential when the decision of the group may change the majority. Given that the
payoff depends only on the outcome majority, replacing this notation in Equation 3, we have
∆Ui(s) =∆w
(i)
C
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ−i
NF−i−NT−i>|Wi|
∏
Wf∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
Wt∈RT
(1− p(t)C )+
∆w
(i)
X
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ−i
|NF−i−NT−i|<|Wi|
∏
Wf∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
Wt∈RT
(1− p(t)C )+
∆w
(i)
C
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ−i
NT−i−NF−i>|Wi|
∏
Wf∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
Wt∈RT
(1− p(t)C ). (4)
In words, the utility differential of a worker is the average of its payoff differential over the three cases defined by
the impact of its group over the majority, this average weighted by the probability of such cases.
Restating Equations (1) or (2) in terms of Equation (4), the equilibrium conditions are, for each group that does
not choose a pure strategy, the differential utility must be zero (∀i ∈ R,∆Ui(s) = 0); for each group that chooses to
cheat as a pure strategy, the differential utility must not be negative (∀i ∈ F,∆Ui(s) ≥ 0); and for each group that
chooses to be honest as a pure strategy, the differential utility must not be positive (∀i ∈ T,∆Ui(s) ≤ 0).
The following lemma, which is crucially used in the rest of our analysis, shows that, if there is a given total order
among the payoff differentials defined, in order to attain a unique equilibrium all groups must decide deterministically.
The proof is based on an algebraic argument.
Lemma 1. Given a game as defined, if ∆w(i)C ≥ ∆w(i)X ≥ ∆w(i)C for every group Wi ∈ W , then there is no unique
equilibrium where R 6= ∅ (i.e, all groups decide deterministically).
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is a unique equilibrium σ for which R 6= ∅ and ∆w(i)C ≥ ∆w(i)X ≥
∆w
(i)
C
for every group Wi ∈ W . Then, for every group Wi ∈ R, ∆Ui(s) = 0 must be solvable. If ∆w(i)C ≥ 0,
for all Wi ∈ R, there would be also an equilibrium where all groups in R choose to cheat and σ would not be
unique, which is a contradiction. Consider now the case where there exists some Wi ∈ R such that ∆w(i)C < 0.
Then, it must hold that |R| > 1, otherwise ∆Ui = 0 is false for Wi. Given that |R| > 1, the probabilities given
by the summations in Equation (4) for Wi are all strictly bigger than zero. Therefore, given that ∆Ui = 0 must be
solvable, at least one of ∆w(i)X > 0 and ∆w
(i)
C
> 0 must hold, which is also a contradiction with the assumption that
∆w
(i)
C ≥ ∆w(i)X ≥ ∆w(i)C .
In the following sections, conditions to obtain unique equilibria under different payoff models are studied. In
all these models it holds that ∆w(i)C ≥ ∆w(i)X ≥ ∆w(i)C for all Wi ∈ W . Then, by Lemma 1, there is no unique
equilibrium where R 6= ∅. Regarding equilibria where R = ∅, unless the task assigned has a binary output (the answer
can be negated), a unique equilibrium where all groups choose to cheat is not useful. Then, we set up pV so that
∆w
(i)
C < 0, ∆w
(i)
X < 0 and ∆w
(i)
C
< 0 for all Wi ∈ W so that ∆Ui ≥ 0 has no solution and no group can choose to
cheat as a pure strategy. Thus, the only equilibrium is for all the groups to choose to be honest, which solves ∆Ui ≤ 0.
Therefore, p(i)C = 0, ∀Wi ∈W , and hence Pwrong = 0.
Reward Model Rm. Replacing appropriately the payoffs detailed in Table 2, we obtain for any group Wi ∈ W
∆w
(i)
C = −pV |Wi|(WPC + 2WBA) + |Wi|WBA +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
X = −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
C
= −pV |Wi|WPC − |Wi|WBA +WCT .
To make ∆w(i)C < 0 we want
pV >
|Wi|WBA +WCT
|Wi|(WPC + 2WBA) , ∀Wi ∈ W.
And the expected utilities are then
UM = MBR − pVMCV − nMCA
UWi = |Wi|WBA −WCT , for each Wi ∈W.
Reward Model Ra. Similarly, for any group Wi ∈W ,
∆w
(i)
C = −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
X = −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
C
= −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT .
Then, the condition to obtain the desired unique equilibrium and the expected utilities are
pV >
WCT
|Wi|(WPC +WBA) , ∀Wi ∈ W,
UM = MBR − pVMCV − nMCA,
UWi = |Wi|WBA −WCT , for each Wi ∈W.
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Reward Model R∅. Again, for any group Wi ∈ W ,
∆w
(i)
C = −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
X = −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT ,
∆w
(i)
C
= −pV |Wi|(WPC +WBA) +WCT .
And the condition to obtain the unique equilibrium and the expected utilities are
pV >
WCT
|Wi|(WPC +WBA) , ∀Wi ∈ W,
UM = MBR − pV (MCV + nMCA),
UWi = pV |Wi|WBA −WCT , for each Wi ∈W.
In order to maximize the master utility we would like to design games where pV is small. Therefore, we look for
a lower bound on pV . It is easy to see that, in all of the three payoff models, the worst case lower bound is given by
the group of minimum size. Although at a first glance this fact seems counterintuitive, it is not surprising due to the
following two reasons. On one hand, colluders are likely to be in the majority, but the unique equilibrium occurs when
all workers are honest. On the other hand, the extra benefit that workers obtain by colluding is not against the master
interest since it is just a saving in computation costs.
3.4 Game 1:n: One Master - n Workers
We now observe how the conditions obtained in the previous game are modified if the master also participates as a
player. The equilibria analysis regarding groups follows the same lines as in Section 3.3. However, now Equations (1)
and (2) have to be applied to the master, as follows.
General Payoffs Model. Recall that R is the set of groups that randomize their choice. Let Γ be the set of partitions
in two subsets (RF , RT ) of R, i.e., Γ = {(RF , RT )|RF ∩RT = ∅ ∧RF ∪RT = R}. Then, for the master,
UM (R,F, T, sM = V ) =
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ
∏
f∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
t∈RT
(1 − p(t)C )mF∪RF ,
T∪RT ,
sM=V
UM (R,F, T, sM = V ) =
∑
(RF ,RT )∈Γ
∏
f∈RF
p
(f)
C
∏
t∈RT
(1− p(t)C )mF∪RF ,
T∪RT ,
sM=V
.
From Equation (1), if pV ∈ (0, 1), the MSNE condition is
UM (R,F, T, sM = V ) = UM (R,F, T, sM = V ).
From Equation (2), if pV = 0 the condition is
UM (R,F, T, sM = V ) ≤ UM (R,F, T, sM = V ),
and if pV = 1 the condition is
UM (R,F, T, sM = V ) ≥ UM (R,F, T, sM = V ).
The MSNE conditions for groups are the same as in Section 3.3. Hence, the conditions obtained for each of
the reward models are the same. However, additional conditions are obtained from the master-utility conditions as
follows. As in Section 3.3, the desired unique MSNE occurs when pC = 0. Using that, in the master-utility conditions
we get for the reward model Rm that if pV < 1, MBR − MCV − nMCA = MBR − nMCA, and if pV = 1,
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MBR − MCV − nMCA ≥ MBR − nMCA. Therefore, in any case it must hold MCV = 0. For the reward
model Ra, the master-utility conditions give, if pV < 1, MBR −MCV − nMCA = MBR − nMCA and if pV = 1,
MBR−MCV −nMCA ≥ MBR−nMCA. Therefore, again, MCV = 0. Finally, for the reward modelR∅, the master-
utility conditions give if pV < 1, MBR −MCV − nMCA = MBR and if pV = 1, MBR −MCV − nMCA ≥ MBR .
Therefore, MCV = MCA = 0. Hence, to achieve the goal of forcing the groups to be honest, in this game, verifying
must be free for the master.
4 Algorithmic Mechanisms
In this section two realistic scenarios in which the master-worker model considered could be naturally applicable are
proposed. For these scenarios, we determine appropriate games and parameters to be used by the master to maximize
its benefit.
The basic protocol (mechanism) used by the master to accept the correct task result while maximizing its benefit
is as follows: Given the payoff parameters (these can either be fixed by the system or be chosen by the master), the
master sends the task (to be computed), the game to be played, the probability of verification pV , and the payoff model
to be used. For computational reasons, the master also sends a certificate to the workers. The certificate includes the
strategy that the workers must play to achieve the unique NE, together with the appropriate data to demonstrate this
fact3. More details for the use of the certificate are given in Section 4.3.
After receiving the replies from all workers, and independently of the distribution of the answers, the master
processor chooses to verify the answers with the probability pV . If the answers were not verified it accepts the result
of the majority. Then, it applies the corresponding reward model. The protocol is detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Master algorithm
send (task, game, pV , payoff model R, certificate) to all workers;
upon receiving all answers do
verify the answers with probability pV ;
if the answers were not verified then
accept the majority;
apply the reward model;
Hence, the master, given the payoff parameters, can determine the game and parameters (including the value of pV )
to force the workers into a unique NE, that would yield the correct task result (with high probability) while maximizing
the master’s benefit. Examples of specific parameters (including the value of pV ) and games such that the master can
achieve this are analyzed in the following subsections.
4.1 SETI-like Scenario
The first scenario considered is a volunteer computing system such as SETI@home, where users accept to donate part
of their processors idle time to collaborate in the computation of large tasks. In this case, we assume that workers incur
in no cost to perform the task, but they obtain a benefit by being recognized as having performed it (possibly in the
form of prestige, e.g, by being included on SETI’s top contributors list). Hence, we assume that WBA > WCT = 0.
The master incurs in a (possibly small) cost MCA when rewarding a worker (e.g., by advertising its participation in
the project). As assumed in the general model, in this model the master may verify the values returned by the workers,
at a cost MCV > 0. We also assume that the master obtains a benefit MBR > MCA if it accepts the correct result of
the task, and suffers a cost MPW > MCV if it accepts an incorrect value.
Under these constraints, the equilibria for games 1:1 and 1:1n collapse to one single equilibrium point. Also, since
game 1:n requires free verification (MCV = 0) for the equilibrium to be unique, it cannot be used in this scenario.
The different applicable cases are summarized in Table 5. In this table it can be observed that in games 1:1 and 1:1n
3The certificate is included only for cases where resource limitations preclude the worker from computing the unique equilibrium, but it is not
related to distributions over public signals (as in a correlated equilibrium) since workers do not randomize their choice according to this certificate.
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(Game,Model) Equilibrium Pwrong UM UWi
pC , pV
(1:1,Rm), (1:1,Ra) 0 ≤ pC ≤ MCVMCA+MPW , pC < 1 , pV = 0 pC MBR − pC(MBR +MPW ) −MCA WBA
(1:1,R∅) 0 ≤ pC ≤ MCV +MCAMCA+MPW , pC < 1 , pV = 0 pC MBR − pC(MBR +MPW ) 0
(1:1n ,Rm), (1:1n ,Ra) 0 ≤ pC ≤ MCVMCA+MPW , pC < 1 , pV = 0 PC MBR −PC(MBR +MPW )− nMCA WBA
(1:1n ,R∅) 0 ≤ pC ≤ MCV +MCAMCA+MPW , pC < 1 , pV = 0 PC MBR − PC(MBR +MPW ) 0
(0:n,Rm) pC = 0,
WBA
WPC+2WBA
< pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV MCV − nMCA |Wi|WBA
(0:n,Ra) pC = 0, 0 < pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV MCV − nMCA |Wi|WBA
(0:n,R∅) pC = 0, 0 < pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV (MCV + nMCA) pV |Wi|WBA
Table 5: SETI-like Scenario
the equilibrium is achieved with any value of pC in an interval. The master has no way to force the specific value of
pC that a worker uses within the interval. And, in particular, it cannot force pC = 0 (i.e., Pwrong = 0). Additionally,
looking at the master utility, all games have UM < MBR . However, in game (0:n,R∅) the master can make UM
arbitrarily close to MBR by setting pV arbitrarily small. (Notice that the utility of a worker will be arbitrarily small
likewise, but given that workers are volunteering this is not a problem.) In conclusion, the game (0:n,R∅) with n = 1
(|W | = |Wi| = 1) and very small pV is the best choice in this scenario, since it satisfies Pwrong = 0 andUM ≈ MBR .
We highlight this observation in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any set of payoff parameters that can be characterized as the SETI scenario, in order to obtain the
correct answer (with probability 1), it is enough to assign the task to only one worker excluding the master from the
game, and verify with arbitrarily small probability. Additionally, if the worker is rewarded only when the result is
verified to be correct, the mechanism yields a utility for the master that is almost optimal.
4.2 Contractor Scenario
The second scenario considered is a company that buys computational power from Internet users and sells it to
computation-hungry costumers. In this case the company pays the users an amount S = WBA = MCA for using their
computing capabilities, and charges the consumers another amount MBR > MCA for the provided service. Since the
users are not volunteers in this scenario, we assume that computing a task is not free for them (i.e., WCT > 0), and
they must have incentives to participate (i.e., UWi > 0, ∀Wi ∈ W ). As in the previous case, we assume that the master
verifies and has a cost for accepting a wrong value, such that MPW > MCV > 0. Again, under these assumptions,
the equilibria for games 1:1 and 1:1n collapse to unique equilibria and game 1:n can not be used. The different cases
are summarized in Table 6. Observe that there are cases in this table in which the group has negative expected utility
UWi . Given that in this scenario workers are not volunteers, they will not accept to participate in such a game. This
fact immediately rules out games (1:1,R∅) and (1:1n,R∅) and requires that WBA > WCT in general. Similarly,
this restriction forces the master to use a value of pV > WCT/|Wi|WBA, ∀Wi ∈ W in game (0:n,R∅). Finally,
comparing games (0:n,Rm) and (0:n,Ra), it can be seen that the master would never choose the former, because the
lower bound of pV is smaller in the latter while the rest of expressions are the same, which leads to a larger master
utility.
In this scenario, beyond choosing the game and number of workers n as in the previous one, we assume that the
master can also choose the reward WBA to the workers for correctly computing the task, and the punishment WPC if
they are caught returning an incorrect value. All possible combined variations of these parameters yield a huge number
of cases to be considered. In what follows, we assume that the master only can choose one of these parameters, while
the rest are predefined. A study of richer combinations is left for future work.
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(Game,Model) Equilibrium Pwrong UM UWi
pC , pV
(1:1,Rm), (1:1,Ra)
MCV
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1 − pV )pC MBR − pC(MBR +MPW )−MCA WBA −WCT
(1:1,R∅)
MCV +MCA
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1 − pV )pC MBR − pC(MBR +MPW ) −pV WPC
(1:1n ,Rm), (1:1n ,Ra)
MCV
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1− pV )PC
(pV (1 − p
n
C) + (1− pV )(1−PC))MBR
−pV MCV − (1− pV )PCMPW
−(1− pV pC)nMCA
WBA −WCT
(1:1n ,R∅)
MCV +MCA
MCA+MPW
,
WCT
WBA+WPC
(1− pV )PC
(pV (1 − p
n
C) + (1− pV )(1−PC))MBR
−pV MCV − (1− pV )PCMPW
−pV (1 − pC)nMCA
−pV WPC
(0:n,Rm) 0,
|Wi|WBA+WCT
|Wi|(WPC+2WBA)
< pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV MCV − nMCA |Wi|WBA −WCT
(0:n,Ra) 0,
WCT
|Wi|(WPC+WBA)
< pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV MCV − nMCA |Wi|WBA −WCT
(0:n,R∅) 0,
WCT
|Wi|(WPC+WBA)
< pV ≤ 1 0 MBR − pV (MCV + nMCA) pV |Wi|WBA −WCT
Table 6: Contractor Scenario
The following notation is used for clarity. Whenever a parameter may be different among different games being
compared, a super-index indicates the game to which the parameter belongs. For instance, U (i,j)M is the utility of the
master for game (i, j). MCA and WBA are referred to as simply S (= MCA = WBA).
A simple observation of games (0 :n,Ra) and (0 :n,R∅) leads to find that in both cases it is convenient for the
master to choose the smallest possible value of pV . For this reason, in the following we assume in these games
values p(0:n,Ra)V =
WCT
WPC+S
+ γ(0:n,Ra) and p(0:n,R∅)V =
WCT
S
+ γ(0:n,R∅), for arbitrarily small γ(0:n,Ra) > 0 and
γ(0:n,R∅) > 0 4.
4.2.1 Tunable n
Regarding games (1 : 1,Rm) and (1 : 1n,Rm), in this case the master has no control over pC or pV , since they are
completely defined by the application parameters. Hence, the probability of accepting a wrong answer might be
arbitrarily close to 1, even for game (1:1n,Rm), because PC grows with n if pC > 1/2 as shown in Claim 6. Given
that we want to design a mechanism that can be applied to any setting, we rule out these games for this case. In the
case that n is tunable, the benefit of the master in games (0:n,Ra) and (0:n,R∅) decreases as n increases. Hence for
these games the master chooses n = 1. (So, |W | = |Wi| = 1.) Additionally, these games provide Pwrong = 0. Out
of these games, (0:n,Ra) is better iff MCV > S(S/WCT − 1)(S/WPC + 1). We highlight these observations in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any given set of payoff parameters, such that it can be characterized as the contractor scenario and
where S = MCA = WBA > WCT , if the master gets to choose the number of workers, in order to obtain the correct
answer (with probability 1) while maximizing the utility of the master, it is enough to assign the task to only one worker
excluding the master from the game and
(i) if MCV < S(S/WCT − 1)(S/WPC + 1), reward the worker only when the result is verified to be correct,
and verify with probability pV = ε+WCT/S,
(ii) otherwise, reward the worker also if the result is not verified, and verify with probability pV = ε+WCT/(S+
WPC ),
for any positive ε arbitrarily close to 0.
4We assume here the worst case scenario where minWi∈W {|Wi|} = 1. If a better lower bound can be guaranteed, a similar analysis taking it
into account follows.
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4.2.2 Tunable WPC
We first compare games (0:n,Ra) and (0:n,R∅),
U
(0:n,Ra)
M = MBR − p(0:n,Ra)V MCV − nS
= MBR −WCTMCV /(S +WPC (0:n,Ra))− nS − γ(0:n,Ra)MCV
and
U
(0:n,R∅)
M = MBR − p(0:n,R∅)V MCV − p(0:n,R∅)V nS
= MBR −WCTMCV /S − nWCT − γ(0:n,R∅)MCV − γ(0:n,R∅)nS.
Thus, game (0:n,R∅) is better iff nS(S/WCT − 1) > MCV for small enough γ(0:n,R∅). Otherwise, (0:n,Ra) is better
for small enough γ(0:n,Ra) and large enough WPC (0:n,Ra). As argued in the previous case, in this case the master
has no control over pC . Although the master can reduce WPC to increase pV , it can not make pV arbitrarily close
to 1 to reduce Pwrong in case pC is big (and consequently PC ). Then, some cases might lead to a big probability of
accepting the wrong answer. Thus, games (1:1,Rm) and (1:1n,Rm) are ruled out from consideration. We highlight
these observations in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For any given sets of workers and payoff parameters, except for WPC that is chosen by the master. If
the set of payoffs is such that S = MCA = WBA > WCT and it can be characterized as the contractor scenario,
in order to obtain the correct answer (with probability 1) while maximizing the utility of the master, it is enough to
exclude the master from the game and
(i) if MCV < nS(S/WCT − 1), reward the workers only when the result is verified to be correct, and verify with
probability pV = ε+WCT/S,
(ii) otherwise, reward the workers also if the result is not verified, set WPC so that MCV < nS(S/WCT −
1)(S/WPC + 1), and verify with probability pV = ε+WCT/(S +WPC ),
for any positive ε arbitrarily close to 0.
4.2.3 Tunable S = WBA = MCA within the interval (WCT ,MBR)
In this case n is fixed, and given that we do not make any assumptions about its magnitude, we evaluate game 1:1
while evaluating game 1:1n for an arbitrary n. Using calculus, the utility of the master for game (0:n,Ra) is maximum
when S(0:n,Ra)max = ±
√
MCVWCT/n −WPC . Due to the aforementioned constraints, only values in the interval
(WCT ,MBR) are valid for S. Assuming then that WCT < S(0:n,Ra)max < MBR , the utilities are
U
(0:n,Ra)
M (S = S
(0:n,Ra)
max ) = MBR − 2
√
nMCVWCT + nWPC and
U
(0:n,R∅)
M = MBR −WCTMCV /S(0:n,R∅) − nWCT − γ(0:n,R∅)(MCV + nS(0:n,R∅)).
Since U (1:1
n,Rm)
M ≤ MBR , game (0:n,Ra) is better than game (1:1n,Rm) whenever n > 4MCVWCT/WPC 2.
On the other hand, game (0:n,R∅) is better than game (0:n,Ra) if S(0:n,R∅) > WCTMCV /(2
√
nMCVWCT −
n(WPC +WCT )), for small enough γ(0:n,R∅). We highlight these observations in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any given sets of workers and payoff parameters, except for S = MCA = WBA that is chosen by the
master. If the set of payoffs can be characterized as the contractor scenario, in order to obtain the correct answer (with
probability 1) while maximizing the utility of the master, it is enough to exclude the master from the game, reward the
workers only when the result is verified to be correct, set S > WCTMCV /(2
√
nMCVWCT − n(WPC +WCT )),
and verify with probability pV = ε+WCT/S, for any positive ε arbitrarily close to 0.
In order to show a scenario where game (1:1n.Rm) is better, we assume now that MPW ≥ 2MCV . Then, under
this assumption, pC ≤ 1/2. The following claim that makes use of this fact will be useful.
Claim 6. For game 1:1n, let PC(n) denote the probability that the majority out of n workers cheat. If the probability
that a worker cheats is pC ≤ 12 , then PC(n+ 2) ≤ PC(n).
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Proof. Let PC(n,> 1) be the probability that, out of n workers, the number of cheaters exceed the number of honest
workers by more than one (i.e., at least 3 given that we consider only odd number of workers), PC(n,= 1) by exactly
one, and PC(n,= 1) be the probability that the number of honest workers exceed the number of cheaters by exactly
one. Then, PC(n+2) = PC(n,> 1)(p2C+(1−pC)2)+PC(n,= 1)(p2C+2pC(1−pC))+PC(n,= 1)p2C . Bounding
pC the claim follows.
From the previous claim, given that PC = 1/2 for pC = 1/2, we conclude that PC ≤ 1/2. Using that pC ≤ 1/2,
PC ≤ 1/2, and MPW > 2MCV , the utility of the master for game (1:1n,Rm) is
U
(1:1n,Rm)
M ≥
1
2
MBR − p(1:1
n,Rm)
V MCV −
1
2
(1− p(1:1n,Rm)V )MPW − nS(1:1
n,Rm)
=
1
2
MBR − p(1:1
n,Rm)
V MCV −
1
2
MPW +
1
2
p
(1:1n,Rm)
V MPW − nS(1:1
n,Rm)
≥ 1
2
(MBR −MPW )− nS(1:1n,Rm).
As shown before, game (0:n,Ra) is better than game (0:n,R∅) when
MBR < WCTMCV /(2
√
nMCVWCT − n(WPC +WCT )).
Comparing games (1:1n,Rm) and (0:n,Ra) when WCT <
√
MCVWCT/n −WPC < MBR , we have (MBR −
MPW )/2− nS(1:1n,Rm) ≥ MBR − 2
√
nMCVWCT + nWPC . Therefore, game (1:1n,Rm) is better whenever
WCT ≤ S(1:1n,Rm) ≤2
√
MCVWCT
n
− 1
2n
(MBR +MPW )−WPC (5)
All three conditions are feasible simultaneously for big enough MCV , therefore there exists a scenario for which
game (1 : 1n,Rm) is better. Notice that under the aforementioned condition, for game (0 :n,Ra) to be better, i.e.,
n > 4MCVWCT/WPC
2
, it must be true that WPC > 2
√
MCVWCT/n and the inequality (5) does not hold.
4.3 Computational Issues
In previous sections, a mechanism for the master to choose games, payoff models, and appropriate values of pV for
different scenarios was designed (based on Algorithm 1). A natural question is what is the computational cost of
using such mechanism. In addition to simple arithmetical calculations, there are two kinds of relevant computations
required: binomial probabilities and verification of conditions for Nash equilibria. Both computations are n-th degree
polynomial evaluations and can be carried out using any of the well-known numerical tools [24] with polynomial
asymptotic cost. These numerical methods yield only approximations, but all these calculations are performed either
to decide in which case the parameters fit in, or to assign a value to pV , or to compare utilities. Given that these
evaluations and assignments were obtained in the design as inequalities or restricted only to lower bounds, it is enough
to choose the appropriate side of the approximation in each case. Regarding the computational resources that the
workers require to carry out these calculations, notice that the choice of pV in the mechanism only yields a unique NE.
Then, in order to make the computation feasible to the workers, the master sends together with the task a certificate
proving such equilibrium. Such a certificate is the value of pV , payoff values, game, and payoff model, which is
enough to verify uniqueness.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we consider computational systems in which a master processor assigns tasks for execution to rational
workers. We have defined the general model and cost-parameters, and we have proposed and analyzed several games
that the master can choose to play in order to achieve high reliability at low cost. Based on our game analysis, we have
designed appropriate algorithmic mechanisms for two realistic scenarios of these kinds of systems.
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While volunteer computing systems used in practice, like BOINC, use redundant task allocation to detect erroneous
answers [2], it is known that this technique can not guarantee correctness in presence of collusion [46]. Interestingly,
our results show that verifying with very small probability can be used to prevent erroneous answers from selfish
workers, even under collusion. A richer exploration of the practical implications of the results in this paper is left for
future work.
In order to expand and generalize our model, we plan to design more complex mechanisms where more than one
parameter at a time is tunable by the master, and consider other realistic scenarios where our work can be applied. It
would also be interesting to consider the case where the workers and/or the master do not have complete information
of all the system parameters (that is, consider Bayesian Mechanism Design, see e.g. [23]). Furthermore, we plan
to consider the more general problem in which there is a sequence of tasks whose values must be reliably obtained.
To this respect, cheater detection mechanisms, as the one considered in [29], must be deployed and multiple-rounds
protocols must be designed.
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